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ing, cultivation. In contrast to this method, advanced agriculture is practiced year after year on the same well tended plot, the fertility of which is maintained by manuring, crop rotation, intensive cultivation, terracing, and often the regular addition of mineral matter in the form of silt deposited on the land by irrigation water. Only occasionally may the land be allowed a short fallow period. This type of tillage may be called permament-field, or sedentary, cultivation.[10]

Shifting cultivation and sedentary cultivation are generic terms used to describe fundamental differences in land use, differences that find their outward expression in the cultural landscape created by those who maintain these economies.[11] Can there be a greater contrast than that between the shifting cultivators' small, irregular, temporary clearings with their chaotic jumble of fallen and half-fallen tree trunks and stumps, on the one hand, and, on the other, an irrigated plain, subdivided into small fields, each surrounded by a dyke—or a steep slope where a succession of beautifully built terraces leads up for several hundreds or even thousands of feet? These kinds of landscape are physical expressions of totally different economies, or modes of life, with different cultural patterns, concepts of land tenure, attitudes toward the soil, and material equipment.

Historically, shifting cultivation without doubt antedates sedentary cultivation, which requires among other things more elaborate techniques and deeper insight into the relationships between soil, tillage, and yields.

Shifting and sedentary cultivation may each be further classified in terms of tools, as we have seen, or in terms of crops, systems of rotation, and the like.[12] For instance, in terms of crops, we may distinguish between grain and grainless culture. Of the two, grainless culture is generally conceded to be the older. One argument for this thesis is that fruits and many of the root and leaf crops may be eaten raw or simply prepared, whereas cereals require more elaborate preparation. The fact that grainless agriculture is largely confined to the fringes of Southeastern Asia also supports the thesis that, at least in this region, grainless agriculture preceded the cultivation of cereals. Still further substantiation is found in Polynesia, where the inhabitants cultivated no cereals when they were first visited

10 Although sedentary cultivation is commonly practiced by people who use plows drawn by animals, there are large areas where it is practiced with little or no use of the plow. Such areas are found in parts of the Philippines, Java, Sumatra, and southern China, where steep hillsides have been terraced and where the nature of the terrain makes the use of work animals impossible. Sometimes individual farms or patches of land are so small that they must be tilled with hoes, even though plows may be used on adjacent farms. In places custom and religious tradition forbid the use of plows and draft animals.

11 Waibel: Probleme der Landwirtschaftsgeographie, 1933, p. 11.

12 For example, we may distinguish: (a) shifting dibble cultivation, shifting hoe cultivation, and shifting plow cultivation; (b) grainless shifting cultivation and shifting grain cultivation; (c) shifting field-forest cultivation and shifting field-grass cultivation; (d) permanent plow cultivation and permanent planting-stick cultivation; (e) permanent four-field cultivation, and so on. Not all of these are found in Southeastern Asia.

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lanzones, papayas, and chicos, which find a good market in Manila, but on the whole we rarely meet in the Philippines such intensive garden culture as in Java. The diet of the average Filipino is not well balanced and is particularly deficient in fruits and vegetables. In recognition of this fact the Bureau of Education and the Bureau of Plant Industry have both done much to impress the peasants with the need for fruit and vegetable gardens. Although the situation has improved during the past forty years and a large variety of fruits is now produced, the country still depends upon imports, whereas with a little effort most of the imported fruits could be produced locally and would furnish an additional source of income. It would be well to encourage the peasants to grow more fruits and to advise them on the most suitable varieties. In the other countries of Southeastern Asia, also, with the possible exception of Java, such advice would be valuable.

The published material available on the importance of gardens in Indochina is similarly limited in quantity. Even Gourou in his study of land utilization restricts himself chiefly to listing the fruits and vegetables found in the gardens and to stating that certain districts are renowned for the quality of their garden fruits. Gourou's list of fruits and vegetables is as varied and extensive, however, as similar lists for any of the other countries of Southeastern Asia.

Wet Fields

Throughout the countries bordering the South China Sea most of the cultivated land is used for the growing of lowland, or wet, rice. For this purpose the fields must be leveled and surrounded by earth dams to impound rain water during the rainy season or to confine the water that is carried to the fields through irrigation canals or lifted to the fields by mechanical means. If a field is properly leveled the surrounding dyke will keep the water everywhere at the same depth. The size of the wet-rice, or paddy, fields, and the amount of labor that is required to make them, depend upon the topography of the region. In the lowlands, where no terracing is required, there is relatively little labor involved in the making of paddies, which are frequently large. A hilly, or mountainous, terrain necessitates terracing, which demands greater effort and reduces the size of individual fields; the steeper the slope, the narrower the paddies. We have only to see the rice terraces of the mountains of northern Luzon, southern Bali, the Preanger districts of West Java, or Sumatra's West Coast in order to realize how much effort has been expended in building these terraces and how much energy must be devoted to their upkeep. The terraces, as well as the wet-rice fields of the plains, represent the accumulated efforts of generations of peasants, each of which has helped to extend the area devoted to the cultivation of wet rice (Figs. 50–58).[1]

Not all people show the same skill in the making of paddies. According to Credner, the Thai are quite helpless on sloping land that requires terracing before wet rice may be planted. They would prefer to migrate to a

[1] [See pp. 115 ff., category 116, -- Analyst]

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region where level land is available rather than undertake the terracing of a hillside; on the other hand, they have been successful in building innumerable canals to tap rivers and spread the water over the plains.[9] However, they do not seem to be able to fight great floods. In contrast, the Annamese of Tongking have built huge dykes against destructive floods and the attack of the sea.

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The problems presented by the cultivation of wet, or lowland, rice change from country to country, from region to region, and sometimes even from village to village. Lowland rice demands a soil thoroughly soaked with water and worked into "a fine soft mud by hoeing, plowing, trampling, or harrowing, and . . . free from weeds." [10] The field must remain under water until the ears of rice begin to fill and harvest time approaches. The amount of water required to grow lowland rice depends upon the variety of rice, the length of its growing period, and the nature of the soil. There are innumerable varieties of lowland rice. One way of grouping them is according to the number of days they take to mature, which ranges from 60 to 300 days. In the Philippines varieties that require less than 150 days are considered early maturing, those that need from 150 to 190 days medium-late maturing, and those needing more than 190 days late maturing.[11] The longer the growing period, the greater the water requirements and, generally, the higher the yields. Normally the water covering the field has a depth of from 10 to 15 centimeters. But "floating rice" can keep pace with a slowly rising flood and reach the amazing height of 4 meters or more. The stems settle on the mud when the water recedes, and new roots start at the upper nodes, while the lower parts of the stems rot away. Floating rice is especially well known in Cochinchina, and I have

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seen it in the Philippines. In 1939 the Department of Economic Affairs in Batavia sent a rice expert to Cochinchina to study floating rice and the possibility of introducing it into southern Borneo.

Lowland rice can be grown on many types of soil as long as a heavy clay subsoil is present to prevent the loss of water through percolation. Copeland states that lowland rice does best in heavy soils that hold water securely, and he adds that it is desirable "that there be, at a depth below the reach of the roots, but not too much further down, an impervious substratum-subsoil or hard-pan." [12] We distinguish between two main types of wet-rice fields: those that depend exclusively upon the rain that is impounded by their dykes, and those that are supplied by an irrigation system and are therefore no longer subject to the irregularities of rainfall.[13]

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9 Credner: Siam, 1935, pp. 203 and 217.

10 Wickizer: "Rice and Wheat," 1941, p. 272.

11 University of the Philippines: Handbook of Philippine Agriculture, 1939, pp. 7–11.

12 Copeland: Rice, 1924, p. 45.

13 An important variation of the second type is the cultivation of wet riceland that has been flooded by rivers rising above their natural levels. This mode of cultivation, which is found especially in the residency of Palembang in Sumatra, in southeastern Borneo, in Thailand, and in Indochina, is not so dependable as irrigation because of the irregularities of the river floods.

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INTRODUCTION

SOUTHEAST ASIA has known its 'empires' of Sri Vijaya and Majapahit, of wide but indefinite sway, and its great kingdoms of the Khmers and of the Thais; but long before the arrival of the Europeans the peninsula of Indo-China and the Malay archipelago had broken up again into isolated fragments. The Spanish, the Dutch, the British, and the French brought large areas under their control and gave them a political and administrative unity they had never known before. Now, under the pressure of new-born nationalisms, the grip of the Western powers is relaxing, and it seems certain that fragmentation will take place all over again. Yet what is happening is no mere repetition of an ancient sequence; nor is it a reversion to a previously existing state.

Evolution, said Herbert Spencer in his celebrated definition, is a change from a relatively indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite coherent heterogeneity.[1] He was thinking primarily of biological organisms but he extended the idea by analogy to human society (an operation with many pitfalls). Yet in some striking way his definition does seem to illuminate what is in process in this Southeast Asia area. Side by side with integration goes differentiation; the scission of wholes into parts, and parts into smaller parts. The old states of East, Central, and West Java and of Sumatra—Jambi, Melayu, Minangkabau—and the Malay kingdom of Malacca were separate, isolated entities with only fitful contacts and associations, yet similarities of race, custom, and language gave

[1] *First Principles*, 6th ed. (London, Williams & Norgate, 1900) pp. 351, 367. Spencer adds, 'accompanied by integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion', but Dr Joseph Needham in quoting this definition ('Integrative Levels; a Revaluation of the Idea of Progress', pp. 233 ff. of *Time: the Refreshing River*) (London, Allen & Unwin, 1937) says that it is important to note that much of Spencer's argumentation depended on assumptions about energy which antedated the modern statistical interpretation of the second law of thermodynamics. Commenting on the definition as a whole, Dr Needham says: 'We may smile at what we may suppose to be the presumption of such a cosmic formula, but we may find ourselves smiling on the wrong side of our faces if, as is not unlikely, Herbert Spencer has hold of the right end of the stick.'

It is perhaps a tactical error to appeal to Herbert Spencer in a period when his ideas are widely regarded as obsolete; but any theory which appears to make some sense of a situation where others fail to do so cannot be disregarded for any such consideration. Spencer derived his definition from the German biologist, von Baer.

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● 184 178 them a certain homogeneity:[1] under the Dutch and the British, the Javanese, the Sundanese, the Amboynese, the Achinese, the Peninsular Malays, and some others have become aware of their identities and, while they share the common aim of independence, they have asserted their claims to separate nationhood.

Evidences of scission are patent over all the area, from the Karen and Arakan secession movements to the division between Annam and Cambodia: the higher integrative level to which the area is tending is not so immediately to be seen. Nevertheless, it exists, and is, in the view of the writer, essentially that of Western political, social, economic, and technological ideas. The whole of the Far East, indeed, is asserting its independence of the West in terms of the principles that the West has taught it—self-determination, human rights, democracy, female emancipation, constitutionalism, economic planning, and industrialization, and this is true even when the insurgents appeal to the inverted-Hegelian, Karl Marx, or to the Communism of Mao Tse-tung. It is so in spite of the efforts of these Far Eastern peoples to give such aspirations a local and national appearance. Just as in Rome the new *jus gentium* was eventually hailed as the natural law and Rousseau in France harked back to Man the Noble Savage, so have the Chinese played the same game from the time when Confucius and Mo Tzŭ under traditional appearances introduced ideas that were essentially new. In 1865 Prince Kung relied on historical argument to advocate the introduction of mathematics into the purely literary civil service examinations (mathematics, he said, were a Chinese invention), and in Java the Nationalists interpret each phase of their revolutionary campaign as the realization of the native pro-

[1] Sir Richard Winstedt, in a letter to the writer, classifies the similarities between the peoples of Malaysia as follows:

(*a*) Homogeneity of race modified by different admixture of negrito, Indonesian, and Mongol blood according to the time and place of migration and by geographical isolation in forests.

(*b*) One language family—modified by the same conditions and by acceptance of Hinduism and Islam on coasts.

(*c*) *One identical body of primitive beliefs* brought down from Central Asia where Babylonian influence had introduced cultural features like haruspicy (taking of omens from livers of animals), god-king, respect for the number 7, the incantation, the pyramid, &c.

(*d*) One material culture. (This also was affected by the influences of the Yuës (bringers of bronze), of Chinese of the Chou period (especially in Borneo, *vide* Dyak testiles), Indians, Arabs, Portuguese, Dutch, and British.)

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phecy of Chayabaya.[1] But the fact remains that, in spite of the traditionalist imprint on the revolution, what these peoples are aiming at, consciously or unconsciously, is not the recovery of a fabulous age but the achievement for their country and people of a new integration. The recently independent countries of India, Pakistan, Burma, and the Philippines aim at large-scale development of their resources in terms of Western techniques; they insist on industrialization (especially the establishment of heavy industries as a foundation of political power), and they talk of reconstruction and development and of raising the standard of living for the millions of their population. At every international conference, from Lake Success to Havana and Baguio to Lapstone, this is the burden of the refrain, be the discussion on trade, health, currency, or civil aviation. Nor is it purely on the material level that this revolution is planned; it demands at the same time reforms of political and social organization that will bring the Far Eastern nations into an equality with the West. The long-term question is whether it is possible to graft Western technology and institutions on to Far Eastern society without altering its essential nature.

China Proper and her neighbours—Tibet, Annam, Korea—all belong to the Far Eastern Civilization (Main Body) of which Dr Arnold Toynbee says, 'the moment of the breakdown may be equated with the break-up of the T'ang Empire in the last quarter of the ninth century of the Christian Era'.[2] As the 'universal state' of the civilization he gives the Mongol and Manchu empires, and he speaks of the history of the existence of the civilization after its breakdown as 'the survival of Far Eastern Society in its petrified state'. But at the same time he points out that, in general, the breakdown of the civilization is not necessarily followed by a disintegration that runs into dissolution. This would suggest that China is in a condition when her institutions have not the vitality or resilience to meet the challenge of external forces.

Commenting on this passage in the original draft, Mr Tom

[1] Chayabaya is a legend-prophecy amalgamating legends of Siva, Adam, and Allah (*not* Mohammed) in Java into a single national legend of a Javanese millennium and a prophecy of a return to it. It assumed protean forms each of which is invoked as political expediency demands. So far as I am aware, the only exposition of Chayabaya is that of Dr C. C. Berg, of Leyden University, which in 1950 had not yet been published.

[2] A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1934–46) iv. 86–7. vi. 306. D. C. Somervell's abridgement of the work, 1947, p. 361.

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184 178 Harrisson (whose approach is primarily that of the anthropologist) remarks that it 'always seems dangerous to equate the culture of the ruling dynasty with the whole of a huge country', and adds that some areas of China have, perhaps, never had a culture at all in the sense intended by Professor Toynbee and they cannot be said to have decayed in the least, but rather to have advanced in historical times. The answer to that is that what is referred to here is a single, integrated culture codified in the ancient canonical writings, permeating the whole of the Chinese people who emigrate overseas (the aboriginal tribes of China do not come within our purview), and expressed down to this very day in the family institutions and moral system of the Chinese both in China and overseas. 'China' in the present text is, however, nearly always the Mangi of Marco Polo, namely South China, and only part of it at that, namely the province of Fukien and Kwangtung and parts of Kwangsi and Kiangsi, and not the Cathay, or North China, of the Venetian traveller. The culture, none the less, is that of China as a whole, and the languages (especially Cantonese) are nearer than those of the north to the ancient language of China.

The reader may feel a protest against the affirmation of the continued advance of the West rising in his mind when he recollects the recent strong, often violent, reaction against the West that is so apparent in Asia—the retreat from the English language as a medium of instruction in post-liberation India, or the cry of 'the West must go' in Burma. The answer is that these incidents are partly the normal 'die-hard' gestures of resistance to change, and partly the expressions of resentment of economic control or political pressure by Europeans as persons, politicians, administrators, or companies. For the revolution set in train by Western ideas is now directed, as we have said at the outset, against Western individuals and nations. The West itself is in a state of flux, shaping its industrial civilization to the standards set largely by America, but challenged by Russia, and the Far East flows willy-nilly with the contemporary current. It is indeed a case, in a special sense, of 'Westward the course of empire takes its way'.[1]

This triumph of the West, however, is affirmed here in no spirit of exultation but with deep anxiety. As there rise up before us the

[1] 'Of all the civilizations, dead or living, of which we know our own is the only one which is possibly still not in decline.' A. J. Toynbee, *The Prospects of Western Civilization* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1949) p. 5.

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symbols of our age—the Petrol Pump, the Pylon, the 'Dust Bowl', the Automat, 'Mass Media', the chilling Neon Sign—there is a shrinking of the soul and a poignant yearning for the glory that was Angkor and the grandeur that was Chang An. Yet it is in its effective organs—the Assembly Line, the Tennessee Valley Authority, 'E.R.P.', and the Research Stations—that our robotic civilization throbs; not in the cult of lost causes or impossible loyalties, nor in our academies, our museums, nor our half-empty cathedrals.

At least it is the material aspects of our civilization which appeal to the awakening consciousness of the peoples of the Far East. Whether they will adopt capitalist, socialist, or communist social organization as a means of securing the coveted gadgets of the West that mean a higher standard of living is another matter. Dr Joseph Needham, for example, says that there is no reason to think that the Chinese will not make as convinced socialists as anybody else, but that there are certain directions in which Chinese thinking might have a profound effect upon the nature of the society of the future, perhaps in the matter of juristic security of the individual, and in the forms which the numinous will take in that society. However, there is far less reason to believe that they will adopt democracy, and Communism, being dictatorial, they will probably find more natural and acceptable than democratic socialism.[1]

This survey is of the Chinese in the regions of Tropical Asia, and often in the course of our narrative the question already posed as to the power of this and other peoples to absorb Western ideas without changing their own essential nature will arise either tacitly or explicitly. In other words, can the basic institutions of these peoples meet the impact of Western industrial civilization or of Marxism without disintegrating?

Chinese civilization is based on ancestor worship, the family system, on Confucianism (which incorporates these principles), and on Buddhism and Taoism. The staunchest supporters of these religions could scarcely deny that Buddhism and Taoism as moral forces are in complete decay in China and have been so for a very long time.[2] Whatever their surviving effectiveness they cannot by

[1] J. Needham, 'Confucianism after 2000 Years', in the *Manchester Guardian*, 29 August 1949.

[2] To realize the formalism and religiosity into which Buddhism had declined by last century, one has only to observe the *chü-jen* (M.A.) of the late Ch'ing dynasty who, to prepare his character for office, suddenly takes an interest in practical benevolence. He ostentatiously burns incense and gives alms. If he sees

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CHAPTER IV

SPECIAL ASPECTS OF CHINESE SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

MOST readers of this survey will be acquainted, at least in a general way, with the problems of China itself and with the direction in which the people of that country have moved in the last fifty years. What will be attempted in this chapter will be to illustrate the way in which the Chinese of Southeast Asia have in some respects deviated from the central pattern under the influence of local conditions. We shall select for this purpose the special aspects of the family, marriage, religion, and education, with some remarks on the opium question. As regards politics, Chapter XXXI, dealing with Chinese political organization in Malaya, brings out the developments which are typical of the area as a whole, and to this the reader is referred should he wish to gain a general impression of the matter before proceeding to the separate country studies.

The Family. An excellent starting-point for our chapter is the work of Dr Ta Chen, who, in 1934 and 1935 was in charge of a group of investigators studying the emigrant communities in eastern Kwangtung and southern Fukien under the auspices of the International Research Committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations.[1] The area selected for study was a region from which many of the emigrants to the Nanyang originated and where their families mostly live. It is on the sea coast of the two southernmost maritime provinces and consists of ten *hsien* (counties). Roughly speaking, it includes a long strip of territory beginning at Chao An (formerly Chao Chou), passing through Swatow on the Kwangtung border, and through Amoy, and ending at Chuan Chou (Ch'üan-chow) in Fukien. It is an area of a little less than 5,000 square miles with a total population of a little over 4·6 million in 1935.[2]

[1] Ta Chen (the name is properly Chen Ta, Chen being the surname, and it is thus given in some library catalogues), *Emigrant Communities in South China: a Study of Overseas Migration and its Influence on Standards of Living and Social Change*, English ed. by Bruno Lasker (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940).

[2] Though all the *hsien* have sent emigrants to the Nanyang the area does not constitute the sole source of emigration to the south, even from these two provinces. For example, Mei Hsien and vicinity, the principal home of the Hakkas and the largest source of Hakka emigration, is not included in this area.

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Chinese

their native country; moreover they have a stubbornness of disposition which distinguishes them from their fellow Chinese. (It is worthy of note that the most numerous among the early Communists in the Nanyang were the Hailams and Hakkas.)[1]

Sun Yat-sen said: 'The Chinese people are of the Han or Chinese race with common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs—a single race.' As regards 'blood' in any scientific sense this is manifestly untrue; on the contrary,

> The modern Chinese people is an amalgamation of many elements originally different from one another. . . . In colour; in stature, above all in cephalic indices, about 42 per cent are mesocephalic and about 43 per cent are brachycephalic, and about 15 per cent dolichocephalic. Even these classes are distinctly subdivided into dolicho-leptorrhinic and dolicho-platyrrhinic. There is also a low-headed type, and, in the South, a trace of a dwarf element. . . . Prehistory points to a race already mixed in the basin of the Yellow River. . . .[2]

In spite, however, of a number of modifications and reservations, the remainder of the statement of the Father of the Revolution, especially regarding religion and customs, could be convincingly maintained. Allowing for the numerous variations which have been suggested above, the Chinese of Southeast Asia, drawn mostly from Fukien and Kwangtung, are quite remarkably homogeneous. Not only have they marked physical characteristics in common; their customs, their religion, their attitude of mind have an almost uncanny similarity. What Clement Williams remarked of their shops in Bhamo on the Yunnan-Burma frontier nearly ninety years ago—'the likeness of one Burmese to another is striking, but the absolute sameness of one Chinese shop to another is truly wonderful'—is equally true of the 'sameness' of Chinese temples, houses, ornaments, customs, methods of mining and agriculture, and handicrafts all over the Southeast Asian area, from the city of Cholon to a remote *tienda* in Mindanao, or from the tin-fields of Larut to the pepper plantations of Cambodia. Nor is this merely a superficial impression (such as 'all Chinese look alike'); it derives from their common steeping in Chinese culture, even though the latter's springs of inspiration have ceased to well up from the depths and it has been for long (as Professor Toynbee says) in a state of petrification.

[1] See p. 370 regarding the Japanese identification of Hailams with Communism.

[2] *China Year Book* [illegible]

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Chapter Twenty-five

PEOPLES, POLITICS AND PROSPECTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE setting of Southeast Asia may be summed up as one of extremes of relief (deltaic plains and mountains) and a climate mostly approaching the wet limit for plant life but merging into monsoonal types. To this setting the people have made varying responses, ranging from migrant food gatherers and hunters in the jungles, to subsistence farmers in the plains, but all turning upon woody materials for weapons, implements, house-structures and domestic utensils, upon rice, the cereal of the wet extreme, and upon social systems of communal help. The whole social and economic life has been galvanised over the past century or two by being more and more drawn into commercial and industrial activities developed in response to and on the basis of external needs for the minerals and agricultural products of Southeast Asia, whereas prior to that time the region was touched only by a trickle of traders moving between India and China.

FACTORS IN THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY

Several factors account for the difficulty of obtaining firm data to fill in our general picture of the historical geography of Southeast Asia. In the first place, there grew up no strong literary tradition to last through the centuries and record the past in a form other than mythical. Here tradition is largely oral and literature essentially Indian rather than indigenous. And whatever there was of local record and history has rotted away quickly, the climate, the ants, insects and moulds soon destroying anything on wood, paper, leather or cloth. Moreover, in this setting of swamps and forest, the most easily available material is wood, and artistic tradition expressed in wood, whether in carvings, buildings or tools, rapidly disintegrates, leaving little of that sort of evidence which is the basis of our facts about early periods in other regions. Buildings and carvings on stone were not normal expressions of Southeast Asia people where over large areas stone is not easily come by and where

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000 The dualisms and pluralities of Southeast Asia society are relatively modern, becoming emphatic only over the past three hundred years, but plural societies and changing values within the units have been apparent in their changing political patterns. First there were the inland political nuclei; the kingdoms of Middle Burma, Upper Siam, Inner Cambodia were matched among the islands by principalities set in the mountains of Sumatra and Java. Then came the little powers related more to the sea than to the land; the Sailendra kingdoms using the Malacca Strait as their bond and artery, the Majapahit sea kingdom whose territories in Borneo, Celebes, Java and South Sumatra may be thought of as footholds for a sailing people, fringing rather than entrenched in the islands (Fig. 113). At a later phase the move of power centres was to the lower rivers of the continental edge, to Lower Burma and Lower Siam. In these historic patterns of political units may be seen operating the influences and traditions of widely differing human types, one rooted in the land, coming overland, depending on agriculture for its welfare and power; the other of seafaring people, many kinds and grades of them, coming to the lands of Southeast Asia by water, relatively mobile on their seaways, fishing and trading through the seas, and always peripheral to the land.

Dual National Foci

369 In most of the constituent political units of Southeast Asia there
● 184 is thus a split of interest (Fig. 117). Burma has a focus at Mandalay
177 and a commercial-administrative focus at Rangoon; the Philippines
631 has a dual nodality round Manila and round the Visayan Islands; Malaya, which has only recently acquired clear internal focus, has two centres of different interest, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, the former exclusively peninsular, the latter as much involved with all Southeast Asia as with Malaya; Indochina has the double pull of the Tonkin (Hanoi) area and the Mekong Delta (Saigon); Java, its old internal focus at Jogjakarta, with Batavia acting as external point of attraction. Sumatra is in the strange position of having several inland nuclei plus the tendency to use Singapore as its outport and route to Batavia. Only Siam can claim to have no second focus, yet even there the channelling toward Bangkok is only natural for the Chao Praya Basin; the Korat Plateau topography leads human and commercial interests towards the Mekong and the border country towards the northwest was once focused on

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the historic kingdoms at Chiengmai. Borneo is laid out so far entirely under centrifugal influences, complicated by the split into British and Dutch zonations.

If this "balkanisation" be true of the individual political units, it is equally strong in the region as a whole, except that the intersection of major seaways and airways tends to make an internal regional focus on Singapore, a tendency diminished by India's economic pull on Burma and South China's pull on the people, trade and foods of Siam and Indochina.

To some extent these dual foci to each territory have been stimulated by the arrival of Western trading systems which pulled in one direction while the traditional interests pull in another, yet in a sense all these political units have been created by colonial powers administering as a unit territories not previously politically unified or previously using the present boundaries. Spain and the United States enforced unity upon what is now the Philippines and in practice had continued difficulty in keeping Mindanao, for example, within the unit. France has imposed a uniformity and a certain coherence upon Indochina which was novel to the constituent units. Malaya as it exists today is a British political creation. Before the Dutch colonial period of the present century, all the islands of the East Indies had never been controlled as one whole.

Environment and States

The continental political units, Burma, Siam and Indochina in some ways may be likened to little Egypts—nucleations of people within attractive, fertile valleys protected in these cases by the nearly empty space of forests and mountains. The combination of natural encouragement and natural protection conditioned major civilisations in Egypt and in Mesopotamia at one phase in history and appears to be equally encouraging in this tropical setting except for one difference, that although this environment on the southeastern fringe of Asia certainly suited the growth of states, its protective isolation was incomplete. In the north the growing riverine states were exposed to intruders. Thus in these riverside nurseries, states were environmentally encouraged to grow in a setting attractive as breeding grounds for nations, though the environment was not sufficiently isolating nor sufficiently protective to enable the nascent states to persist. So far as the main islands were concerned, on our maps they appear as more emphatic units

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than their elongated forms, difficult interiors and cliffed, marsh or forest edges in fact justify. Rarely has any one of the major islands been the locale of a single people singly governed, homogeneous and integrated into an island-state. These large islands have been dispersive and fragmentive to the peoples in them.

Postwar Nationalism

The postwar effusion of nationalism in Southeast Asia is thus a paradox. It is a nationalism of plural societies and substantial minorities, without homogeneity inside the states, and without a nation, as understood in Europe, and very much a culmination of the insecurity and uncertainty produced by the divergent influences which have long been at work, breaking down old social integrations and their warm, human associations, substituting for them nothing but commerce and the new myth "economic man," cold, inexorable and not adequately or fully integrated with Southeast Asia people and their setting.

The devolution of Southeast Asia from colonial into nationalist units takes place at no propitious time. The cultivation of rice has been predatory, the accumulated effects of which are now showing in diminishing yields; new paddylands before the war were ceasing to be so easily available and the war threw a large proportion of the old lands out of cultivation. Rubber has found a competitor in synthetic rubber, and its production may repeat the history of sugar. Tin recovers from the war slowly because equipment has been lost. Plantation crops have lost labour, markets and opportunities. Yet Southeast Asia is still increasing its people faster than the world average. Its increase, however, has gone on at a slower rate in the already congested areas and at a faster rate in what had been the emptier areas of South Sumatra (with Javanese migrants), in Mindanao (with Filipinos), in Johore (by Chinese immigrants), as well as in Laos, Dutch Borneo and Inner Siam, by local increases. Thus Southeast Asia has been filling up, though there is little prospect yet of an even distribution.

Devolution

The Southeast Asia population is expanding now as the trade systems which provided its first impetus to expansion shrink and lose coherence. The atmosphere is one of relinquishing colonies, but under circumstances when they are involved in an international

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allows the replacement of compulsion by wages, the effect on native society and welfare is much the same as when development proceeds by private enterprise.

General Course of Development. Thus, whether the method of development be through native enterprise working for the market, or through western enterprise employing native labour, 'the disintegration of social life is an almost inevitable result of the contact of primitive peoples with European civilization'. In either case the liberation of economic forces from the moral restraint imposed by social obligations is detrimental to social and individual welfare. During the first stage there may be, and usually is, a rise in the standard of individual welfare through the removal of the abuses normally inherent in native social life. For a still longer period there is an increase in production, by the exploitation of social welfare for material ends. But, as such forces gain in strength, they tend to restrict and even to reduce production, and thus defeat the hopes of gain which set them working. Forests are laid waste and valuable lodes of ore are buried beneath surface workings. Cultivation, as in the delta of Lower Burma, aims at the maximum net outturn by the smallest number necessary to produce it, instead of at the maximum gross outturn by the largest number that the land will maintain at the customary level of social life. Human resources are wasted by under-employment or by unemployment and, as in the Congo under Leopold, so many people may be killed off that capitalist enterprise is no longer profitable or even possible.[1] Both the two great East India companies went bankrupt, and the modern chartered companies had to surrender their concessions because they could no longer pay their way. Profit, progress and welfare, are all linked together on a single chain, and economic forces, unless controlled by social will, corrode the chain that links them. Man is a social animal, but economic forces tend to convert human society into a business concern. In tropical dependencies the outward and visible sign of this is the evolution of a plural society.

4. The Plural Society[2]

All tropical dependencies, and indeed all tropical countries, so far as they have been brought within the modern world, have in common certain distinctive characters in their social structure. In Dutch

[1] Frankel, pp. 36, 37.
[2] Furnivall, *Economic Journal*, 1910, pp. 23 ff; *JRCAS*, 1942, p. 195.

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184 colonial literature they are often said to present a dual economy, comprising two distinct economic systems, capitalist and pre-capitalist, with a western superstructure of business and administration rising above the native world in which the people, so far as they are left alone, lead their own life in their own way according to a traditional scale of values in which economic values rank so low as to be negligible. It is unquestionably true that there is a wide difference between the social standards of tropical peoples and those of the modern West, that the natives are slow to assimilate western values, and that over native life there is a western superstructure representing an outpost of Europe and not rooted in the soil. Yet the Dutch picture of a native world, in which economic values are disregarded, seems, so far as it is based on facts, to be drawn from Java, where for some two hundred years employers secured labour through compulsion rather than by appealing to the desire of gain. In Africa likewise, as we have just noticed, a popular belief in the native disregard of economic values has been held to justify compulsion as a means of securing labour. But everywhere experience has shown that the desire of gain can easily be stimulated or, rather, liberated from the control of custom. In British colonies under indirect rule, interpreted according to the British tradition of the rule of law, economic forces soon permeate the native world and, in colonies under direct rule, it is just in the economic world that all men meet, if not on equal, yet on the same terms. Even in respect of Dutch dependencies some of their own writers vehemently dispute the theory of a dual economy.[1] Yet in all tropical dependencies the western superstructure over native life is a prominent feature in the economic landscape.

But the western superstructure is only one aspect of a distinctive character, common to all tropical dependencies, that cannot fail to impress even the most casual observer; the many-coloured pattern of the population. In Burma, as in Java, probably the first thing that strikes the visitor is the medley of peoples—European, Chinese, Indian and native. It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere there is a division of labour along racial lines.

[1] Meijer Ranneft, J. W., *Koloniale Studiën*, 1928, p. 151.

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Natives, Chinese, Indians and Europeans all have different functions, and within each major group subsections have particular occupations. There is, as it were, a caste system, but without the religious basis that incorporates caste in social life in India. One finds similar conditions all over the Tropical Far East—under Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, British, French or American rule; among Filipinos, Javanese, Malays, Burmans and Annamese; whether the objective of the colonial power has been tribute, trade or material resources; under direct rule and under indirect. The obvious and outstanding result of contact between East and West has been the evolution of a plural society; in the Federated Malay States the indigenous inhabitants number barely a quarter of the total population. The same thing has happened in the South Pacific. The Fiji chieftains invited British protection, and one result has been that half the inhabitants are immigrants from India. In African dependencies there are Indian immigrants in East Africa and Syrians in West Africa, and in some regions the 'coloured', or Eurafrican, population forms a separate caste. Sometimes a section of the native population is westernized: 'there are some territories, of which those in West Africa are perhaps most typical, in which sections of the population most closely in contact with European influences have attained a development out of all relation to the rest of the population . . . which is often still living in primitive conditions and has interests different from those of an urban or industrial society'.[1] One finds much the same thing in Java, and in all tropical dependencies 'westernized' natives are more or less cut off from the people, and form a separate group or caste. The plural society has a great variety of forms, but in some form or other it is the distinctive character of modern tropical economy.

Outside the tropics society may have plural features, notably in South Africa, Canada and the United States, and also in lands where the Jew has not been fully assimilated into social life; in other countries also there are mixed populations with particularist tendencies. But in general these mixed populations have at least a common tradition of western culture, and, despite a different racial origin, they meet on equal terms and their relations are not confined solely to the economic sphere. There is a society with plural features, but not a plural society. It is significant that, in Canada and the United States, and also in Australia, when the influx of alien elements threatened national life and common social standards, barriers were raised against free

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, pp. 34, 44; Teeling, L. W. B., p. 126.

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•184 immigration. In tropical dependencies there was no common social will to set a bar to immigration, which has been left to the play of economic forces. The plural society arises where economic forces are exempt from control by social will. It is general in the modern tropics because everywhere and always the social order seems to have had plural features. In Burma under native rule the people were not organized territorially but on quasi-feudal lines by race and occupation, and that is the normal character of tropical society based on personal authority. But in such lands, apart from minor backward groups, there is a common cultural tradition; there is a society with plural features but not a plural society. Again, in the great fairs held annually in medieval times in ports and market towns, each company of merchants was governed by its own heads according to its own customs. But the concourse did not form a plural society, because it lasted no longer than the fair. All that happened was that, during the fair, the town was transformed into a bazaar. In the modern tropics the bazaar lasts throughout the year, and the whole country is converted into a shop or factory; from a social organism into a business concern. Despite certain plural features, tropical society was distinct from the plural society which has been created by economic forces. This is a modern invention because, only in modern times, have economic forces been set free to remould the social order. The result is a social structure quite distinct in its political and economic properties from the homogeneous unitary society of western lands and, for a solution of colonial problems, it is essential that its properties should be clearly understood. Let us examine it first in its political aspect and then in its economic aspect.

Political Features. On looking at a plural society in its political aspect one can distinguish three characteristic features: the society as a whole comprises separate racial sections; each section is an aggregate of individuals rather than a corporate or organic whole; and as individuals their social life is incomplete.

To Europeans the incompleteness of individual social life is most readily apparent in the European section. The European works in the tropics, but does not live there. His life in the tropics centres round his business, and he looks at social problems, political or economic, not as a citizen but as a capitalist or an employer of labour. Many Europeans spend twenty years or more in the tropics, and, on retiring from work to live at home, they know no more of the country than on the day they landed; nothing of the people or even of the

7: Furnivall C-4, 5 (no date) 1948 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

language. Foreign orientals, likewise, are transient; they come merely to make money and their interest in the country is purely economic. The life of the ordinary native is similarly incomplete. He is a cultivator and nothing more. Under native rule the people lived within a little world, but their cultural horizon was co-extensive with its boundaries; under western rule their horizon is contracted to their life as cultivators and their social life is less comprehensive than before.

If we look above the individual to the group in which he forms a unit, we find a similar contrast between the plural society of tropical dependencies and the unitary society that western peoples take for granted. In all accounts of the modern tropics we read of the collapse of corporate tribal or village life and the atomization of society. In the foreign sections the individual stands even more alone; even among Indians caste loses its validity, and in every census in Burma it has been found impossible to compile useful returns of Indian castes. Among the Indian immigrants in South Sea Islands one may even find mixed marriages between Muslims and Hindus. Europeans often deplore the isolation of the individual in their own section. Men are continually on the move; they form business acquaintances but not friends; there are no children in the home; the club and not the home is the centre of social life, and all look more or less eagerly to going 'home' on retirement. Each section in the plural society is a crowd and not a community.

On a wider survey of the plural society as a whole comprising separate groups, we may find the nearest analogy in a confederation of allied states, united by treaty or within the limits of formal constitution merely for certain common ends, but otherwise, in matters outside the terms of union, each living its own life as a separate province. Yet this analogy fails to bring out the full complexity of a plural society. In a confederation each unit is segregated within its own territorial limits; there is contact between the states but not between their members as individuals; the union is voluntary; the terms of union are definite and limited; and any party can at will withdraw from the confederacy. In a plural society the sections are not segregated; the members of the several units are intermingled and meet as individuals; the union is not voluntary but is imposed by the colonial power and by the force of economic circumstances; and the union cannot be dissolved without the whole society relapsing into anarchy.

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184 Like a confederation, a plural society is a business partnership rather than a family concern, and the social will linking the sections does not extend beyond their common business interests. It might seem that common interest should tie them closely, for a dissolution would involve the bankruptcy of all the partners. But the tie is strong only so far as this common interest is recognized. Perhaps the only plural society inherently stable is the Hindu society in India. Here there are separate groups or classes, partly racial, with distinct economic functions. But in India caste has a religious sanction, and in a plural society the only common deity is Mammon. In general, the plural society is built on caste without the cement of a religious sanction. In each section the sectional common social will is feeble, and in the society as a whole there is no common social will. There may be apathy even on such a vital point as defence against aggression. Few recognize that, in fact, all the members of all sections have material interests in common, but most see that on many points their material interests are opposed. The typical plural society is a business partnership in which, to many partners, bankruptcy signifies release rather than disaster.

Economic Features. The political aspect of the plural society is reflected in its economic aspect. A plural society is no ordinary business partnership. In form it is also a political society and is, or should be, organized for 'the good life', the welfare of the people, enabling them to live as well as possible. As a business partnership its function is solely economic, to produce goods as profitably as possible. But as a social institution also it has an economic aspect, and is concerned with both production and consumption, supply and demand. It is in the interest of a society that its members shall get what is best and not merely what is cheapest; by custom or law it must regulate demand. It is also in the interest of society that in the supply of goods, production for profit shall be regulated by custom or law on behalf of social welfare. In a plural society both supply and demand take on a special character.

Let us first consider the matter of demand. In buying goods it is only common sense to pay no more than necessary. But purchasers are not always guided solely by common sense. Some will pay a higher price for home products than for foreign products, or for goods untainted by sweated labour. In such cases there is a social demand for home manufactures, or for a higher standard of wages. In this matter there is a difference between the plural society and the homo-

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geneous society. When the recent depression flooded Java with cheap cottons from Japan, European merchants tried to boycott Japanese goods; but the boycott collapsed because Chinese merchants bought them and seemed likely to capture all the trade. When Britain annexed Upper Burma the British Government contemplated retaining the Burmese prohibition of trade in opium and alcohol, but this was impossible because the demand of the Chinese and Indians had to be met. In a plural society the feebleness of social will is reflected in the weakness of social demand, which is the economic aspect of social will. Economists deal in great detail with problems of aggregate demand but, partly it may be because they take a homogeneous society for granted, they have not given social demand so much attention as it deserves. If any town or village in the western world wants better sanitation, it can spend more on conservancy. There is a collective demand which may conflict with individual demand, and at periodical elections people can choose between better conservancy and having more money in their pockets. Economists can measure this collective demand with their supply and demand curves and schedules, but collective demand is only one form of a social demand that, in general, defies measurement. The monastic schools in Burma were a response to social demand, but no one could estimate their cost, or balance it against their value. In tropical countries social demand usually takes effect through custom. Sometimes a patch of scrub jungle round a village is reserved as a public convenience and is closed to fuel cutting. People could get their fuel with less trouble, more cheaply, by cutting timber there, but social demand, taking effect through village custom, prevails over individual demand. So long as custom retains its force, no one would think of cutting down the scrub. But we have noticed that in Rangoon Indian immigrants saw a way to make easy money, and cleared the scrub to sell fuel in the market. Individual demand for private gain prevailed over the social demand for common welfare, and prevailed the more readily because society was no longer homogeneous. Even in the West social demand is most effective when it requires no stronger support than custom, because no one thinks of encroaching on it. In London rickshaws might be cheaper than taxis, but we would walk rather than use them. The individual demand for cheaper transport is overborne by the social demand for human dignity. And because we resist the temptation of cheapness we finally attain better, and probably cheaper, transport in tubes and motor-buses. During

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184 the present century Rangoon, in common with most eastern towns, has been flooded with rickshaws. In Batavia the Dutch refused to sanction them; they disliked seeing Javanese between the shafts and already had too many Chinese. Now motor transport in the towns of Java is probably better and cheaper than in any country in the tropics. Social demand can take effect only through organic social will as embodied in the social structure, and, in default of social will, individual demand prevails over social demand. A villager in Burma may wish to spend money on schooling for his children, but the maintenance of a school is conditional on the existence of social demand and, if there is no village school, he may spend his money on giving them new clothes, or on furniture that he does not use, or even on English books that he cannot read.[1] If he cannot satisfy those wants which he has as a member of society, he will satisfy his individual wants; he must take what he can get.

Here is one of the distinctions between a homogeneous society and a plural society. A plural society is broken up into groups of isolated individuals, and the disintegration of social will is reflected in a corresponding disorganization of social demand. Even in a matter so vital to the whole community as defence against aggression, the people are reluctant to pay the necessary price. In religion and the arts, in the graces and ornaments of social life, there are no standards common to all sections of the community, and standards deteriorate to such a level as all have in common. And because each section is merely an aggregate of individuals, those social wants that men can satisfy only as members of a community remain unsatisfied. Just as the life of an individual in a plural society is incomplete, so his demand tends to be frustrated. Civilization is the process of learning to live a common social life, but in a plural society men are decivilized. All wants that all men want in common are those which they share in common with the animal creation; on a comprehensive survey of mankind from China to Peru these material wants, essential to the sustenance of life, represent the highest common factor of demand. In the plural society the highest common factor is the economic factor, and the only test that all apply in common is the test of cheapness. In such a society the disorganization of social demand allows the economic process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest to prevail.

If, again, we examine plural economy from the standpoint of production or supply, we find a similar predominance of economic forces.

[1] Furnivall, *Economic Review*, 1912, pp. 380 ff.

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In selling goods it is common sense to charge as much as one can. All those engaged in production have in common, in greater or less degree, the desire for gain, to get as much as possible while giving as little as possible. But, in a plural society, that is almost all they have in common. Everywhere, in all forms of society, the working of economic forces makes for tension between groups with competing or conflicting interests; between town and country, industry and agriculture, capital and labour. In a homogeneous society the tension is alleviated by their common citizenship, but in a plural society there is a corresponding cleavage along racial lines. The foreign elements live in the towns, the natives in rural areas; commerce and industry are in foreign hands and the natives are mainly occupied in agriculture; foreign capital employs native labour or imported coolies. The various peoples meet only in the market, as competitors or as opponents, as buyers and sellers. In Burma the Indian and Chinese middlemen form combines against both the cultivator and the European miller, and Europeans form combines against both middleman and native. In Java the nationalist movement first assumed a popular character in action against the Chinese, whom Europeans at the same time were describing as worse than ten epidemics. In Indo-China Annamese and Europeans regard the Indian moneylender as a pest. It might seem that, on a long view, all sections have a common interest in the common welfare, but the foreign elements, European or oriental, mostly need not look beyond the day when they will leave the country. In any case, the end is so remote that it is out of sight; so far as the horizon of the business man extends sectional interests are opposed. It is true that big business with large capital investments in the country must take long views, and sees further than the cultivator who does not look beyond the harvest and the coolie who looks only for to-morrow's rice, but it looks on the country as a business enterprise.

Moreover, within the economic sphere there are no common standards of conduct beyond those prescribed by law. The European has his own standard of decency as to what, even in business, 'is not done'; so also have the Chinese, the Indian and the native. All have their own ideas as to what is right and proper, but on this matter they have different ideas, and the only idea common to all members of all sections is the idea of gain. In a homogeneous society the desire of profit is controlled to some extent by social will, and if anyone makes profits by sharp practice he will offend the social conscience and incur

7: Furnivall G-4,5 (no date) 1948 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

moral, and perhaps legal, penalties. If, for example, he employs sweated labour, the social conscience, if sufficiently alert and powerful, may penalize him because aware, either instinctively or by rational conviction, that such conduct cuts at the root of common social life. But in the tropics the European who, from humanitarian motives or through enlightened self-interest, treats his employees well, risks being forced out of business by Indians or Chinese with different standards. The only deterrent to unsocial conduct in production is the legal penalty to which those are liable who can be brought to trial and convicted according to the rules of evidence of infringing some positive law. In supply as in demand, in production as in consumption, the abnormal activity of economic forces, free of social restrictions, is an essential character of a plural society.

In colonial relations then, economic forces both create a plural society and, because unrestrained by social will, continue to prevail. The dictum of Dr Boeke, that we have already noted with reference to Java, applies to tropical economy in general: 'there is materialism, rationalism, individualism, and a concentration on economic ends far more complete and absolute than in homogeneous western lands; a total absorption in the exchange and market; a capitalist structure, with the business concern as subject, far more typical of capitalism than one can imagine in the so-called "capitalist" countries, which have grown up slowly out of the past and are still bound to it by a hundred roots'.[1] In the first half of the nineteenth century economists eulogized economic man; in the last half they said he was a myth. Unfortunately they were mistaken. When cast out of Europe he found refuge in the tropics, and now we see him returning with seven devils worse than himself. These are the devils which devastated the tropics under the rule of *laissez-faire* and which it is the object of modern colonial policy to exorcise.

5. Modern Colonial Policy

The foregoing analysis of the course of social evolution in tropical dependencies under a regime of *laissez-faire* may perhaps appear superfluous, for *laissez-faire* is dead, and modern colonial policy aspires to be constructive. The constructive policy, as originally conceived, reflected popular Darwinism, the survival of the fittest, and looked mainly to efficiency. Gradually however it was permeated by the idea of social justice which gathered force in Europe with the re-

[1] Boeke, cited *Netherlands India*, p. 452.

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thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural resources of the whole region.

This change-over from a subsistence economy to a commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops. It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, upsetting the balance of a medieval world. The free, individualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate strength of family and village. But the most serious direct threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's ownership of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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• 184 distribution, and aspects of Western colonial policy which have tended to increase the contrasts between parts of the region, there are certain considerations of broader nature and of far-reaching significance that give validity to the concept of Southeast Asia as a regional unit possessing certain common features which will be discussed in brief as follows:

a. Common heritage of colonialism.

b. Dual economy.

c. Plural society.

d. Dominance of the agricultural section.

e. High rate of population growth.

f. Determination to industrialize.

g. Small size of market and slow rate of capital formation.

433 The direction as well as the pace of economic develop-
648 ment in the colonial or protected areas of Southeast Asia has been primarily determined by the overriding economic interests of the imperial powers. Even in Thailand, where political independence was preserved, economic dependence upon European capital resulted in the creation of a characteristically 'colonial' economy. This is exemplified by the following conditions: (1) producer of raw materials; (2) concentration on a few export products; and (3) lack of manufacturing industries. As a consequence, these countries are highly affected by substitution, price fluctuations, and changes in consumer demand. Furthermore, they are dependent on limited markets for export, and hence are adversely

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197 particularly the Palaung, Wa, and Riang; and finally the Mon-Khmer group proper.

The language of the Mon is spoken on the coast of the gulf of Pegu. Inscriptions date from as far back as the 11th century. They are in Myazediin script. Khmer is spoken in Cambodia, and its inscriptions are available from about the first half of the 7th century. There are also about a dozen other dialects spoken by scattered tribes throughout this area.

The Mon-Khmer languages are sometimes grouped together with Munda, a large family of languages spoken in the Northeastern sector of India today —but this is not supported by evidence. Similarly, it may be doubted if dialects of this language family have really spread into Yunnan in Southwest China. For example, Wen Yu showed recently that Min-chia, long held to have been a Mon-Khmer dialect, belongs in reality to Tibeto-Burman ("A study of synonyms in the Min-chia language," *Studia Serica* 1 (1940), 1–28). The term "Austroasiatic"—if it means more than just Mon-Khmer—covers a multitude of linguistic methodological sins. And if the existence of an "Austroasiatic" family of languages is doubtful, an "Austric" superstock, combining the former with Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian), is much more improbable still. For further information on Mon-Khmer consult the writer's "Examination of the Austroasiatic language family" (*Language* 18 (1942), 206–17), which contains references as well as a lengthy list of languages, and further his "Bibliography of Mon-Khmer linguistics" (*Studies in Linguistics*, Vol. 1, No. 11, 1943).

It is only fair to point out, however, that in a recent paper, "Thai, Kadai, and Indonesian: A new alignment in Southeastern Asia" (*American Anthropologist* 44 (1942), 576–601), Paul Benedict attempted boldly to combine into a single language family Thai, Indonesian and "Kadai"—and further to add this hypothetical family to Mon-Khmer-Annamite, and in a further synthesis, Miao-Yao. "Kadai" is a new term of the author's for Kelao, Laqua, and Lati of the mainland, that is, in Southcentral China and the China-Tonkin border region, and Li of Hainan. This writer regards Benedict's interesting attempt with a good deal of scepticism, for the type of evidence he uses to prove his hypothesis is not altogether satisfactory. Further judgment may well be postponed until new and better material to work with has been collected.

THE INDONESIAN LANGUAGES

197 Indonesian (Malayan) is a family of languages spoken over an enormous
171 territory: the Malay Peninsula, the East Indies, the Philippine Islands,
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Madagascar, and Formosa. Furthermore, a distant but clear relationship exists between Indonesian on the one hand, and the Oceanic languages, Melanesian, Micronesian, Polynesian, on the other.

The dialect spoken on the mainland, around, say, Perak, is known simply as Malay; this is, moreover, something of a *lingua franca:* "bazaar" or "pidgin" Malay and is understood throughout the Indies, except in some of the interior districts.

The large number of dialects in this area—there are 87 in the Philippine Islands alone—cannot be accounted for in terms of separate waves of migrations, for ethnology recognizes no more than three major ones; the distinctions become less puzzling, however, if we consider the geographical factors which resulted in ethnic isolation of more or less small groups. Perhaps the most isolated, and hence the most divergent, dialects of Indonesian are spoken in Madagascar; the Hova dialect of the Malagasy group is the literary one.

The chief groups on the Philippine Islands are four: the Luzon group (chief dialects, Iloco, Ibanag, Apayao, Kalinga, Tingguian, Bontoc, Ifugao, Igorot, Ilongot, Tagalog), second, the Bisaya group (chief dialects, Cebu-Bisaya, Panay-Bisaya), third, Mindoro-Palawan (chief dialects, Mangyan, Kuyónon, Tagbanua), and finally, the Mindanao-Sulu group (chief dialects, Lanao, Magindanao, Subanon, Mandaya, Bagobo, Kulaman, Tiruray). For a map of distribution of these and other dialects see Herbert W. Krieger, "Peoples of the Philippines" (*Smithsonian Institution, War Background Studies No. 4*, Washington, 1942, Fig. 4).

Some of the dialects in the East Indies are as follows. Sumatra: Minangkabau, Karo and Toba (together known as Batak), Gayo, Kubu, etc. Mentawey is spoken on the island by that name. Dayak and Punan are spoken in Borneo. Java: Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese. Celebes: Toradja, Bulu, Tontemboan, Bugis, Makassa, Bareqe. Balinese is the language of Bali. There are a good many others as well.

Several members of the Indonesian family, Malay in particular, have been studied with more or less thoroughness. But the best material is in Dutch and available only with difficulty here. For an excellent recent contribution in America cf. the outline of Iloco (a Philippine dialect) syntax (*Language* 18 (1942), 193–200), by Leonard Bloomfield.

The empires of the Mon and the Khmer were shattered in relatively recent times by folks who spoke Burmese and Thai respectively. The speakers of these languages dominate Burma and Thailand today, and Mon-Khmer is rapidly disappearing.

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THE INDO-CHINESE LANGUAGES

197 Both these dialect groups belong to the Indo-Chinese family of languages.
184 Chinese, of course, is the best known member of this family. Thai, as far as evidence now indicates, may be said to be another member. Thai is generally divided into two groups, the Chuang group, spoken chiefly in Kwangsi and southern Kweichow and in parts of Hainan, and the Southwestern group.

This Southwestern group itself divides into several dialects. One of these is Shan, spoken in the Shan states of the north by about one million souls; some of whom inhabit parts of Yunnan province. The P'o, the Kamti, and related tribes also speak dialects of Shan. Ahom, formerly spoken throughout Assam, is another member of this Southwestern group. Tai Blanc, Nung, Tho, and others, form a third grouping, and are spoken in French Indo-China as well as the southwestern part of Kwangsi. Finally, and chiefly, there is Thai itself, the official language (Bangkok dialect) of Thailand, and its closest relative, Lao, spoken by the Laos of the North. The first Siamese writing that we possess dates from the period of the famous king Ram Gamheng, with inscriptions of the 13th century.

197 Some recent studies on certain aspects of Thai may be recommended to the interested reader: they are, "Types of reduplication in Thai" (*Studies in Linguistics*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1942), and "The use of numeral classifiers in Thai" (*Language* 18 (1942), 201–05), both by Mary Haas. The best short discussion of the position of Thai in the Indo-Chinese family may be found in the 1938–39 issue of the *Chinese year book*, by a very reliable scholar, Li Fang Kuei ("Languages and Dialects," pp. 43–51).

Annamese is another bone of contention between scholars. On the one hand stands Maspero, linking this group definitely with Thai, and on the other hand stands Przyluski, supported recently by Benedict, linking it with Mon-Khmer. That the latter are wrong and Maspero is right, as far as evidence now indicates, was demonstrated by the brilliant Chinese scholar Wen Yu ("On the kinship of the Annamitic language," *Meridio-Occidentale Sinense*, 1 (1940), 66–73). Wen Yu rightly rejects, and effectively, Przyluski's lexical and morphological arguments; then he shows that Maspero's phonological arguments can fully be supported from the morphology, concluding that "from morphological study the Annamitic is completely in harmony with the Thaic."

Tibeto-Burman seems to be another branch of the Indo-Chinese family. Among the languages of the Burman side is, of course, Burmese itself. About sixteen dialects of this language are spoken by approximately ten

14: Heine-Geldern E-4 (no date) 1942 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

the latter's man-eagle Garuda. Another noteworthy example of an incarnation of Vishnu was king Sūryavarman II of Cambodia (12th century) who erected his own memorial monument as a gigantic temple of Vishnu: the famous Angkor Vat. We find further the idea of plural incarnation, also known from ancient India. Thus the Pararaton tells us that Angrok (13th century), the founder of the dynasty of Singasari and ancestor of the kings of Majapahit, was an incarnation of Vishnu, begotten by Brahmā from a mortal woman, and at the same time a son of Śiva. King Krtarājasa (died 1316 A.D.), the founder of the empire of Majapahit, is immortalized by a statue representing him as Harihara, a compound of Vishnu and Śiva. Even the simultaneous incarnation of Hindu and Mahāyāna Buddhist deities occurs. Thus, to quote only one example, the Javanese king Krtanagara (killed 1292 A.D.) was considered as an incarnation of Śiva as well as of the Dhyāni Buddha Akshobhya. Accordingly, he became known in Javanese tradition under the name of Śiva-Buddha.

It may be added that the theory of divine incarnation could be used not only as a means to exalt the position of the legitimate king, but equally well as a justification for usurpation of the throne. Thus the above mentioned Angrok, the founder of the kingdom of Singasari, was an usurper with a long criminal career as embezzler, robber and murderer. Yet, in spite of his criminal past, he became king, according to the Pararaton, because he was an incarnation of the gods.

The theory of divine incarnation as found in Hinduism and Mahāyāna Buddhism is incompatible with the doctrine of the Buddhism of the Hīnayāna. This difference in tenets is clearly expressed even in the lay-out of capital cities. In ancient Cambodia a temple formed the center of the capital and thus the Mount Meru of city and empire. In Burma the center of the capital is invariably occupied by the royal palace, and it is this latter which is identified with Mount Meru. In ancient Cambodia either Śiva in his form as Devarāja, the eternal essence of kingship, or the Bodhisatva Lokeśvara, the "Lord of the Universe," inhabited the "central mountain" and from there pervaded the empire. Hīnayānist Buddhism does not recognize an eternal deity. Indra is but the king of one of the lowest heavens, the second one from the earth. He is as little exempt from death and rebirth as any human being, except that his life lasts longer. The same may be said of the inhabitants of the higher heavens. All these "gods" of Hīnayāna Buddhism should more appropriately be called angels. They have no temples and no cults. Thus it is easy to understand why in Burma no temple could be set in the center of the capital city. The adaptation to cosmological principles and

14: Heine-Geldern E-4 (no date) 1942 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

the deification of the king here had to be attempted by other means. By erecting the palace in the center of the city and by identifying it with Mount Meru, the lord of the palace, i.e. the king, became automatically the representative of Indra. We might even say that he was "the Indra" of this smaller universe, the Burmese empire but he held his place only by the magic of parallelism and he was no incarnation of the real Indra as the ancient Javanese and Cambodian kings had been incarnations of Siva and Vishnu.[7] This scheme explains the great sanctity in which the royal palace was held in the Buddhist empires of Farther India. The palace was the symbol of the celestial mountain, nay, more than a mere symbol: it was "the Mount Meru" of the microcosmos Burma, or Siam, or Cambodia. Anybody nearing the palace had to show his reverence by dismounting from his horse, by shutting his parasol, by bowing to the palace spire or even kneeling down. Attempts to exact the same expressions of reverence from British envoys led to endless negotiations and frictions as the latter refused to comply with a demand which they considered humiliating. "King of the Golden Palace" was one of the most important titles of Burmese monarchs. Yet, the fact that the king "was Indra" and therefore ruler of the country only as possessor of the empire's Meru, the palace, involved great dangers. It worked as a constant temptation for would-be usurpers, be it from the ranks of the royal family or outsiders, as the occupation of the palace might be achieved by a coup-de-main with relatively small forces and usually meant the conquest of the whole empire. Many Burmese and Siamese kings therefore were virtual prisoners in their palace which they did not dare to leave for fear it might be seized by an usurper. The last king of Burma, Thibaw, preferred even to forego the important coronation ritual of the circumambulation of the capital to offering one of his relatives a chance to make himself master of the palace while he was away.

In Hīnayāna Buddhism the idea of divine incarnation as justification of kingship is replaced by that of rebirth and of religious merit. It is his good karma, his religious merit acquired in previous lives, which makes a man be born a king or makes him acquire kingship during his lifetime, be it even by rebellion and murder. A typical instance is that of king Nyaung-u Sawrahan (10th century) as told in the Glass Palace Chronicle of the Kings of Burma. Nyaung-u Sawrahan, a farmer, kills the king who has trespassed on his garden and whom he had not recognized. Thereupon he is himself made king against his wish. So strong is his karma that, when one of the ministers ob-

[7] However, strong traces of the belief that Siva and Vishnu incarnate themselves in the king survive in the coronation rituals of Siam and Cambodia.

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RICE CULTIVATION IN ASIA

By INEZ ADAMS

243 THE terminology employed by writers discussing Asiatic rice agriculture has raised a problem: are the cultivated varieties of rice distinctly separable into one group that will grow under none but irrigated conditions, and another that demands moderate amounts of moisture but is successfully produced only by dry farming? The terms used in the literature frequently bear this implication. They include references to "wet" and "dry," "dryland," "lowland," "upland" and "mountain" rice. In anthropological studies whose purpose is merely descriptive this creates confusion. When extended to comparative studies and historical reconstructions, with the two methods of cultivation treated as distinct for the conclusions reached, it becomes necessary to examine the distinctions that might justify such use.

101 As early as 1820, John Crawfurd, writing his "History of the Indian Archi-
171 pelago," observed that rice is known as "padi . . . in all languages and dialects
243 from Madagascar to the Philippines."[1] He distinguished in Java a "marsh"
● 184 rice, sown in nurseries and transplanted to flooded fields, and a "mountain" or "dryland" rice, grown on arable uplands. These terms remain current. Lowie defines them thus:

243 The innumerable variations of the plant fall broadly into two categories, with corresponding techniques of husbandry. "Swamp" rice can be grown only in marshes or under irrigation. "Mountain" rice yields smaller crops, but can be grown anywhere with normal precipitation.[2]

Wilhelm Wagner[3] speaks in a similar sense of "den gewöhnliche Wasserreis" and "den sogenanten Bergreis," in his account of Chinese agriculture. C. Daryll Forde makes the same general differentiation of cultivated rices falling[4] into two groups due to the physical requirements of the plant. Wissler[5] mentions "The cultivated varieties known as 'hill,' 'upland,' or 'dryland' rice," in contradistinction to the "aquatic varieties." Keesing,[6] in one work on the Philippines, employs "wet" and "dry" rice; elsewhere[7] he speaks of "dry agriculture" in Indonesia, as distinguished from the practice of terracing with irrigation.

E. M. Loeb,[8] in his general ethnography of Sumatra, notes rice raised in both flooded and dry fields by the Bataks; in the Minangkabau, . . . "wet and dry rice fields are worked together by the men and women . . . ";[9] in Nias, . . . "both the wet and dry variety are grown . . . ";[10] in Atjeh, "Rice is of both the wet and dry variety. The wet rice fields, when not laid in swamps, are irrigated

[1] Crawfurd, 1820, Vol. I, p. 358. [2] Lowie, 1938, p. 294. [3] Wagner, 1926.
[4] Forde, 1934. [5] Wissler, 1946. [6] Keesing, 1937. [7] *Idem.*, 1934.
[8] Loeb, 1935. [9] *Ibid.*, p. 101. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

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178 caused or hastened a flight to the relative security of the city. These forces have been operating in combination particularly in Rangoon, Jakarta, Saigon, and Manila and largely are responsible for their extremely rapid postwar growth. Lesser cities in Java, for example, such as Surabaya, Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Surakarta, also have increased in population because of rural insecurity; and in Burma in several towns and cities up to 50 per cent of the population has been resident less than four years, for the same reasons. These migrations have not, however, necessarily been accompanied by greater employment opportunities and consequently cannot be regarded as indexes of more rapid urbanization and associated socioeconomic change.

The great cities of Southeast Asia possess many features in common, not the least of which is their youth. This quality they share also with several of the great cities of the United States, but there the resemblance ceases.[11] In 1800 Rangoon, Saigon, and Singapore did not yet exist in city form; Bangkok, the new capital of Thailand, was less than twenty years old; Manila and Batavia (Jakarta), though then about two hundred years old, were merely small coastal towns. They began to grow rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the development of the treaty ports in China, the opening of Japan, the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, the opening of the

[11] For the most part the growth of the Southeast Asian cities was not associated with a total transformation of society but with a strong indigenous tradition, as in the case of Bangkok, or with the juxtaposition of a segment of a new civilization alongside the old, as in the case of Rangoon. In America the cities represented the culmination of a social transformation in a virtually unoccupied frontier region. The same is true of Manchuria, the northeastern frontier of pioneer settlement in China, which is more recently, and more highly, urbanized than any other part of China. In Manchuria, as in the United States, there is a quite regular gradation of city sizes, and the Primate City cannot be clearly identified.

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Suez Canal in 1869, and the consolidation of Western control, direct or indirect, over most of Southeast Asia in the 1890's, followed by American acquisition of the Philippines at the turn of the century.

More important, the great cities were, and to a large degree still are, foreign creations, essentially alien to the Southeast Asian landscape. Although several began as native settlements, they developed as foreign exclaves on the margins of Asia, in much the same way as did the plantation system and mining operations. With the exception of Bangkok, they represented and functioned as the overseas appendages of Western, not indigenous, interests, being what Spate has called "head-links"—the gates by which Western concepts entered to destroy and build and in which a new system of economic organization evolved.[12] Indeed, the concept of the Asian plural society was inspired by the contrast between the basically foreign great city and the indigenous agricultural village. The ties of the great city with its hinterland were primarily commercial and associated with foreign-controlled mining and plantation interests and with Chinese-dominated rice trade. Such direct political-administrative ties as did exist were restricted primarily to indigenous elites, small in number, which allied themselves with Western interests. Where the indigenous rural populations were affected by these urban-rural relations, it was primarily through the plantation or the mining system, both of which needed a large labor force, or through Indian or Chinese intermediaries.

On the other hand, the relations between an indigenous capital, like Bangkok in its earlier period, or Kyoto or Peking, and the agrarian society upon which it was based were of quite a different order. In these cases the capital represented the culmination of what might be termed a national *ethos*, the epitome of what Redfield has

[12] O. H. K. Spate, "Factors in the Development of Capital Cities," *Geographical Review*, October, 1942, p. 628.

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called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13]

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954.

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localised according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailams, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

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cubicles behind and above.[16] Usually constructed in continuous rows and back to back, this type of tenement is among the more conspicuous evils in Southeast Asian cities. On the urban peripheries and wherever interstices appear in the modern street and housing pattern, slum villages appear which consist of house clusters usually constructed of bamboo and *atap* palm, highly inflammable and unsanitary.[17] These also are found in and on the margins of the lesser cities but are most striking in juxtaposition to the sleek boulevards of Singapore, Bangkok, and Jakarta.

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A further index of the cultural and economic pluralism of the great cities is their frequent division into old and new towns. In China, especially in the treaty ports, this distinction is usually between an old Chinese and a modern foreign city. The same is true of India. In Southeast Asia the contrast is most often between an old and a modern town both of Western origin, as in Jakarta, Manila, Singapore, and Rangoon. To a notable degree each of these is also a planned city. In Saigon the contrast is between predominantly Chinese Cholon and Saigon itself. In Bangkok, however, there are the old Siamese castle town, a new town of indigenous origin, though of European design, and a Chinese town or quarter nearly as old as the castle town itself. Pluralism is seen not merely in the division of a city into old and new parts or into quarters but also in the separation of the predominantly outward-oriented great city from an up-coun-

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[16] For a description of the "shophouse" see R. H. Hughes, "Hong Kong: An Urban Study," *Geographical Journal*, March, 1951, pp. 9–10.

[17] These areas, the so-called "kampongs," are historically enclaves of the countryside within the city. They form small social cells which together cover most of the surface area in and on the margins of the great cities. Separately, they constitute the rural villages, which in the densely settled portions of Java, for example, are so closely spaced that they collectively exhibit population densities as high as those in many cities (see photographs in J. M. Fraser, "Town Planning and Housing in Singapore," *Town Planning Review*, January, 1953).

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try, indigenous, cultural or political subcenter. Just as Shanghai had its Nanking and Peking, so Rangoon has its Mandalay, Jakarta its Jogjakarta, Manila its Cebu, and, in a variant form, Singapore its Kuala Lumpur.

In the past these cities sited along the Asian littoral have been the funnels through which produce from the interiors have reached tidewater and the world of commerce and Western manufactures have penetrated. Through the increasingly metropolitan channels have flowed the ideas of the West as well as its material goods. In a sense they have acted both as a catalyst for social and economic change and as a cushion which modified the shock of the earlier cultural contacts.

With the exception of Singapore, the site of each of the great cities of Southeast Asia is an ill-drained riverine or coastal lowland strategically placed in relation to an exceptionally productive agricultural region. Again, with the exception of Singapore, none possesses a deep natural harbor suitable for modern ocean-going shipping. The three mainland ports are both river and ocean ports and must be reached through tortuous and shallow river channels. All are entrepôts. Jakarta and Manila are located on the most highly developed islands of the archipelagoes, for which they act as entrepôts. Only in Indonesia and Indochina are there major competitors for the two greatest ports —Haiphong, the outlet for the densely populated Tonkin delta, and Surabaya, the regional capital for the Great East of the Indies, itself an empire. Each great port virtually dominates the national import trade; all tend, however, to share some part of the national export trade with lesser ports. In spite of these great similarities, the nature and functions of the ports differ markedly. As Allen observes: "All ports are individual. History, geography, politics, and economics all contribute to making them as they are. Few universal principles apply, and attempts to force uniformity on ports which have grown up differently are bound to fail."[18] Singapore, for example, is one of the

tial area is primarily on higher ground in the northern part of the city. The University of Malaya is located in Singapore, though plans are being made to move it to Johore Baru on the Malayan mainland. Being largely a Chinese city, Singapore has come to act as a center for the Nan Yang expatriate Chinese, and the city has been chosen as the site of a new Chinese-language regional university.[20] Nevertheless, its air is not that of a Chinese city, nor, for that matter, is it English. Like all great cities, it is cosmopolitan, but it is also culturally rootless, perhaps more so than any of the other great cities of the region.

At the other extreme is Bangkok, most indigenous of the great cities. Founded as the last of a series of "forward capitals"[21] by the Thai in 1783, after the destruction of Ayuthia by the Burmese, the city has never lost its native quality. The soaring rooftrees of *bot* and the spires of stupa stamp the Bangkok skyline with a character of its own. The city is located on the left bank of the Menam Chao Phya within the southernmost great bend of the river some twenty miles from its mouth. Exceptional problems of poor drainage plagued the city from the start, and its numerous *klongs* or canals have given it the rather misleading title of the "Venice of the East."

A Chinese city early appeared to the southeast of the original castle town and in time became part of the central business district. As the lesser *klongs* were filled in to become roads, the city continued to expand. A new city appeared on the northern outskirts of the old, a planned creation built in the reign of Rama VI with broad boulevards and buildings ranging from shocking Victorian variations on Italian Renaissance to more recent battleship modern. The contrast between the façade of modern buildings fronting these boulevards and the stilted, bamboo, thatch, and tin-roofed houses

[20] Richard Butwell, "A Chinese University for Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1953.

[21] See reference to Cornish in Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

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behind them is one of the most striking demonstrations of cultural dualism in Southeast Asia.

Unlike the other great cities, Bangkok originated as the capital of a land-oriented agrarian state. Its proximity to tidewater was accidental. In 1822 the ship bearing the Crawfurd mission to the Thai court barely was able to cross the bar at the mouth of the Menam, then covered by only four feet of water.[22] Its poor harbor and its remoteness from the major shipping routes of the South China Sea conspired to retard the development of the city as a port until the end of the nineteenth century and to retain it as an anachronism in Southeast Asia—a growing city, nearly great, surely primate, but indigenous rather than Western. Nevertheless, since it was through Bangkok that Western influences filtered into Thailand, it is a case of an indigenous capital acting as a revolutionary medium for socioeconomic change.

Bangkok is still the least convenient port of the great cities in Southeast Asia. The bar across the mouth of the Chao Phya was dredged through only in 1952, and port facilities are modest as compared with the other cities. Indeed, most vessels still anchor in the Bight of Bangkok in the lee of the island, Kao Hsi Kang, at the mouth of the Chao Phya and transship their cargoes to and from river barges and country boats which link the island with Bangkok. Surprisingly, the freight tonnage handled at Bangkok is about one-third that of Singapore, although the volume of shipping is only one-tenth as large. The explanation lies partly in the large bulk shipments of rice which form the main export. Partly, also, there is a lower load factor at Singapore, since much of the shipping which enters its harbor is as much dependent on the local complex of service facilities as on cargo potential. At Bangkok, peripheral as it is to the main trade routes, few vessels call without assurances of sizable cargoes.

[22] See J. Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China* (London: H. Colburn & R. Bentley, 1830).

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On the other hand, changes in transportation have elevated Bangkok to a new importance. It lies astride the main air route between Europe and the Far East, and the Australia-Europe services also pass through it. It is now the leading international air center in Southeast Asia, with 42 international departures a week in 1953 as compared with Singapore's 27, and its airport is one of the larger commercial fields in the Orient.

The role of the Southeast Asian great city has been modified by the Pacific war and the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and partial independence to Vietnam. Five of the six great cities are now capitals of the independent states. Each of these merits the title "link capital"; that is, they are the media through which the newly independent states are linked with the outside world. At the same time, they have begun to assume an increasingly indigenous character. The substitution of Malay for Dutch names and street signs in Indonesia is only one evidence of cultural change. The in-migration of petty officials, tradesmen, and refugees from the beleaguered rural areas has given the urban populations a new and more homogeneous native cast. The fevers of nationalism have made the large minorities more cautious about flaunting their ethnic independence.

[i.e. as compared to the inconvenient port facilities -- Analyst]

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361 On the other hand, the war also brought in-
178 creased American influence into the region,
631 and the ubiquitous Coca-Cola sign is one of
•184 the symbols of change that sooner or later
will be followed by changes in urban facili-
ties and urban organization.

162 More important, the present period is as-
563 sociated with an increasing intensification of
171 the economic activities of government and a
corresponding diminution of foreign enter-
369 prise. Political and administrative functions
have become increasingly important since
the war. Since the main governmental or-
gans are concentrated in the largest centers,
the direct influence of the great city upon
the country in which it is primate is likewise
increasing. Relations between nationalized
city and an increasingly money-oriented
countryside are becoming more intimate,
and the formerly clear-cut cultural distinc-
tiveness of city and country is rapidly be-
coming blurred. Therefore, the likelihood of
the great city's leading a revival of ancient
value systems, as some extreme ethnocen-
trists hope it will, is small. Only one predic-
tion can be made: the days of the culturally
alien and ethnically distinct urban center
are numbered in Southeast Asia; and a city
like Singapore becomes increasingly an
anomalous relict of an age now past.

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local custom and religious rule, had been present for centuries. But there was little in the economic situation to sharpen it, and the Muslim leaders themselves were often so steeped in the local ways that they allowed as the religious law what was, in fact, the local custom. With the growth of Western processes, the perception of new economic advantages tended to change the equilibrium of the two principles. The advance of education and heightened consciousness of Islam as a world faith also tended to make the religious leaders themselves much more keenly aware of any divergence. Wealthy men who want to leave property to their sons, men with a strong religious sense, men who regard themselves as progressive, or who are in revolt against their clan leaders, therefore tend to be protagonists of the Muslim law. The conservatives, those who see in the custom a defence for women, those who see in it a symbol of an essentially Malay way of life, argue for the retention of the custom. Contact with the West, they say, is changing the structure of the peasant society enough already. The issue has also entered the modern political scene, since the search for factors to increase Malay integration tends to stress the national and extra-national character of Islam at the expense of the more local qualities of the *adat*. Here too it is growing Westernization which has sharpened the issue.

In a general discussion such as this, one may be allowed to refer to the peasantry of South East Asia as a body. But they are not uniform in ethnic composition, in national interests, in language, in religion, or in general culture. Moreover, within any local community, there are competing, even conflicting, interests and opinions. The peasant may be unable to face up to the general issues which affect his life so deeply, but in so far as he understands his own interests he is very alive to them and capable of exercising keen judgement in them. It is the small scale of his organization for the most part which renders him so vulnerable.

What is likely to be the future of South East Asia from the peasant angle? Prediction is not worth much, since so many elements in the situation are imperfectly known, but there are a few which seem to be significant. The peasant has no native middle class, of the same society as himself, to give a lead to his development and stability in any wider economic organizations that may be set up for his benefit. To improve his economic lot, and in particular to give him a larger fraction of his product through control of marketing, co-operative societies have often been proposed and sometimes tried. Their success has been only limited, partly because the peasant has not been fully persuaded of their attractions as against what the alien middleman can offer, and partly because of the difficulty of securing adequate technical supervision and administration at a sufficiently low official level. Much is now apt to be made of the colonial or semi-colonial status of the South East Asian peasant as a drag upon his development. There is no doubt that colonialism, as a specific form of political control of under-developed territories by a metropolitan Power, is